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I. INTRODUCTION
The unification of Germany on 3 October 1990 formed a watershed event
for the closing twentieth century. Will Germany become a hegemonic power
in the new strategic environment? What are the strategic implications of the
present restructuring of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr)? Since the
Berlin Wall crumbled under the shadow of the Brandenburg Gate, Germany,
Europe, and the international community have undergone historical change.
The Soviet bear looming on the Central European Front has vanished as well
as the Bipolar World and the division of Germany. With the effective statecraft
of the United States and its allies, national unification of Germany became a
reality.
The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has a population of 80 million,
the fourth largest economy in the world, and a strategic location in heart of
Europe. No other country in Europe plays such a critical role in shaping the
future course of the European Community (EC). Germany already plays a
leading role internationally in economic, political, and strategic affairs.
This study examines the factors that have contributed to the strategic
restructuring of the Bundeswehr. Not since its activation in 1955 has the
Bundeswehr experienced such dramatic changes as have occurred since
unification in 1990. From a national defense force posture aligned within
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Bundeswehr is making a
transition to highly mobile, rapid-reaction units that can be deployed at short
notice anywhere in the world. This step is a direct consequence of the
fundamental changes that have taken place in the political and security
environment in Europe, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact.
Upon unification in October 1990, the FRG assumed the task of military
expansion into the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). The East
German National People's Army (NVA) was perceived by the West German
Bundeswehr as a challenge which was politically and ideologically integrated
to Soviet military power. The NVA was regarded by some NATO analysts as
the most effective armed force in the Warsaw Pact. It was equipped with
modern weaponry and was regarded the most professional army in Eastern
Europe.
The international agreements that determined future force level
requirements on Germany are the Two-Plus-Four Talks of 1990 and the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Germany agreed to meet
a future end-strength of 370,000 troops by 1994. Besides the reduction in forces,
Germany must dispose of vast amounts of equipment including thousands of
armored vehicles and stockpiles of ammunition that Germany inherited from
the NVA. Never before has the Bundeswehr been confronted with the need to
reduce its military potential so drastically.
The German defense debate since January 1991 has focused on the issue
of amending the German Basic Law or constitution. This move will perhaps
allow Bundeswehr participation in future multilateral out-of-area operations
under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). Chancellor Helmut Kohl has
called for a constitutional amendment that would allow German forces to
participate in future UN operations as well as future European actions
organized under NATO or the Western European Union (WEU). Certain
German politicians and military leaders quite rightly emphasize that
Germany's significance in the world is also measured in terms of its ability to
rapidly provide military assistance to allies under attack, just as the Germans
expected and received assistance from their cohorts during the Cold War.
Together, these factors have been conducive to a major reorientation of
German defense planning. However, internal and external anxieties about a
revival of German militarism have produced a confused defense policy. Not
only in Europe but around the world, enduring memories of Hitler's War still
limit Germany's ability to play a role commensurate with its economic and
military strength, as well as its geopolitical importance. For many, the
unification of Germany brought back images of the Prussian-German past that
had faded through the years since 1945.
Due to historical coincidence, German diplomacy was fully engaged in the
process of unification when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The Gulf
War marked a turning point for the Bundeswehr. Germany suddenly found
itself criticized for being a pacifist by not sending military forces to fight with
the allied coalition in Iraq. These accusations occurred despite the
constitutional obstacles in sending troops. The war highlighted how quickly
and dramatically the expectations of Germany's neighbors and allies had
changed and how inadequate the German defense policy had become in light
of these changes.
Not long after the Gulf War, Germany was riddled with accusations by
alliance partners for being too assertive in the Balkan quagmire. The swift
recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991, is believed by many to
have accelerated the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. An unfortunate analogy
was drawn between this recent German initiative and the alliance between the
Third Reich and the Croatian Ustasa regime of World War II.
Today, the Bundeswehr faces a head-on challenge at home against greater
economic, political, and social crises of unity. With the overwhelming
economic and social costs of unification, the defense budget will become a tasty
piece to carve in the total pie of the federal budget. It has come as a
tremendous shock for Germans to realize that unification is more complex,
more time consuming, and more expensive than they realized in 1989-1990.
Will the enormous cost of unification cause Germany to turn inward from
the international community? Germany is in the midst of a crisis that defies
easy comparisons with past historical patterns. This thesis will argue that
Germany is not nationalizing its defense structure. Makers of German defense
policy understand that their future security can only be achieved within the
context of integrated defense structures with its Western allies.
With these concepts in mind, the strategic question for force planners is:
Will there be the capability with a slashed military budget and a massive
reduction in forces to provide defense at home and fulfill its international
duties? How does this military institution reflect greater political realities?
Germany must reequip and reorganize its forces to conduct out-of-area
missions. The German government must also resolve the constitutional
dilemma to deploy forces under the auspices of the UN in order to fulfill the
UN Secretary Generals desires.
It is no coincidence that a German White Paper on the armed forces has
not been published since 1985, and attempts since then have been discarded
time and again. To assess the German military of the future, it is essential to
express the German perspective on the Bundeswehr and how the force plays
an integral part in German society. The Bundeswehr is a crucial instrument of
German security policy. With the end of the Cold War, the Federal Republic
must confront the issue that the Bundeswehr no longer exists solely to protect
Germany. It is the twofold process of this study to examine the historical
context of the Bundeswehr and the future functions it will have to perform.
II. A DIFFICULT FATHERLAND
One should recall that modern Germany as a single nation-state dates
back only to 1871. Unification came as the industrial revolution of the
nineteenth century accelerated and as a result of passage of arms. Otto von
Bismarck's diplomacy and the effective Prussian army brought the separate
German lands together and established a single government.
During the Thirty Years' War, Germany was twice on the verge of
unification, in 1629 by Albrecht von Wallenstein and in 1631 by Gustavus
Adolphus. 1 Both men failed to unite the German principalities and the dawn
of the empire was postponed for 240 years.
The legend of Prussian-German military invincibility was born over three
centuries ago. The Great Elector, Frederick William of Brandenburg, created
what we know as Prussia.2 The Brandenburger had little chance to prove his
military skills convincingly. Europeans, exhausted by the Thirty Years' War,
"took saber-rattling for great deeds, and believed in Brandenburg-Prussian
superiority."3
aJacob C. Burckhardt, Reflections On History (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1979),
p. 337.
2David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II To Hitler
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 179.
3Erwin C. Lessner, Blitzkrieg and Bluff: The Legend of Nazi Invincibility (New
York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1943), p. 3.
In his memorandum to his successor, Frederick William wrote in 1667,
"Alliances to be sure are good, but forces of one's own, upon which one can
rely, are better. It is these, thank God!, that have made me considerable since
the time when I began to have them."4 Prussia developed a great advantage
over its neighbors in Europe, both German and foreign. It created an effective
administrative apparatus and a modern draft system that provided Prussia with
a disproportionately large standing army.5
The superiority of the prussian army was made possible by its
organization, peacetime training, and perfection in military strategy. The
origins of the Prussian General Staff date back prior to 1806. Gerhard von
Scharnhorst implemented the general staff and reorganized the War Ministry
in 1809.6 He created a special division that educated, mobilized, organized,
and trained the Prussian army.7
In the essence of Prussian military tradition, it was the Prussian military
which defeated Napoleon at Leipzig in October 1813, and imposed its
hegemony upon Germany in 1866. At the dawn of forging the German Empire,
4Gordon A. Craig, The Germans (New York: New American Library, 1982), p. 238.
5Josef Joffe, "German Defense Policy: Novel Solutions and Enduring Dilemmas,"
in Gregory Flynn, ed., The Internal Fabric of Western Security (London: Croom Helm,
1981), p. 64.
6Hajo Holborn, "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General
Staff," in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1986), p. 283.
7
Ibid.
the army created a state, and not vice versa. "Prussia is not a country with an
army but an army with a country."8
After 1866, military values permeated the most elite areas of German
society. When the Second Reich was established in 1871, after defeating
France, the military was the critical factor in the strategic calculus of Germany.
As a result, the empire created by Bismarck and the Prussian military did not
fully recognize popular sovereignty and true self-government.9 Germany was
in essence an authoritarian state.
From 1871 to 1945, the German military was the main obstacle to "effective
parliamentary government and progress toward democracy."10 During World
War II, the Western Allies agreed that the German General Staff and the
Wehrmacht (German Army) would be abolished. "Germany would never again
be allowed to have an army."11
These ambitions were nullified by the Cold War. After World War II,
Germany was divided into two separate entities. The traditional hegemonic
power of the Wehrmacht was gone, but both East and West Germany rearmed.
8Michael G. Roskin, Countries and Concepts: An Introduction to Comparative
Politics, fourth edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992), p. 144.




Hitler and National Socialism were merely replaced by Stalin and Communism
as the free world's enemy number one.
After the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces on 8 May
1945, Germany was carved up by the Allies. According to the Berlin
Declaration, Germany was divided into American, Soviet, British, and French
occupation zones. The FRG was established on 21 September 1949, although
its sovereignty was limited by the Allied military occupation.
III. FORMATION OF THE BUNDESWEHR
All too soon, the Cold War brought the Americans to call for the arming
of the newly created Federal Republic of Germany. How would western
security against the Russians be assured, yet still protect the West against the
revival of German militarism? The answer which emerged in 1955 was the
Bundeswehr.
The Bundeswehr was created over a fifteen year period from 1950 until
1965. Initially, the Germans were to provide a contingent to a joint European
army. After 1954, the Germans were to create their own national armed forces,
a task which was not fully completed until the late 1960's. 12 Of crucial
importance, the new force was born while memories of German aggression and
genocide remained fresh in ones mind. Many in America and Europe wanted
to assure that Germans would never again bear arms.
The young Federal Republic in the fall of 1949 faced its own set of
security problems. The FRG was utterly defenseless and stood essentially
alone and outside the emerging structure of NATO defense. 13 Even though
evidence pointed towards some kind of association or alliance between the new
state and the West, the precise means did not yet exist.
"Professor Donald Abenheim, "Military Thought in the West German Armed
Forces" (manuscript, Naval Postgraduate School, 1988), p. 6.
"Ibid., p. 55.
10
President Harry Truman's first answer to the Soviet threat in Europe had
been the highly successful diplomatic measures of 1947. The Truman Doctrine
proclaimed support for regimes resisting communism. The Marshall Plan
provided financial support to aid the economic recovery of wartorn Europe.
On the contrary to receiving significant development aid from the United
States, the FRG government of Konrad Adenauer had no federal police force
on hand at the time when the Volkspolizei (KVP) in the GDR was acquiring
heavy weapons and combat echelons for mechanized warfare. 14 In the Soviet
zone of occupation, a handful of former Wehrmacht officers began to plan the
armed force that ultimately became the German contribution to the Warsaw
Pact, the NVA. 15
While the NATO allies and the WEU would defend their own troops
should these be attacked on German soil, the western zones of occupation in
the FRG were outside the aegis of NATO. The citizens of the FRG had no
assurance that anyone would come to their defense should the vicious Russian
bear come rumbling across the border of the Soviet zone. In effect, the FRG
was essentially a "no mans land" for the defense of western Europe. 16
When Konrad Adenauer became Chancellor of the FRG in September







a western security guarantee. He was ambitious to bind the western allies to
a system of collective defense. Adenauer was unyielding to the Western allies,
that they would have to take the Federal Republic as a full partner in a
collective security system, or not at all.17
As late as one month before the outbreak of the Korean War, the
American State Department reaffirmed their position on the Potsdam
Agreement of demilitarization. They insisted that a demilitarized Germany
remained the policy of the United States, despite the growing calls from the
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Germans would have to make some kind of
contribution to Atlantic defense.18
With the Allies in firm control of Germany, the outbreak of the Korean
War surprised the free world. It was widely thought that aggression in Asia
could easily trigger a communist move in Western Europe. This prompted a
reappraisal of Soviet ambitions in the minds of American policymakers and the
requirement to strengthen NATO.19
Could Germany be protected from a Soviet attack without rearmament?
In 1948, the Berlin Blockade and the airlift from the three Western zones to
17Dirk Verheyen, The German Question: A Cultural, Historical, and Geopolitical
Exploration (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 111.
18Abenheim, manuscript, op. cit., p. 57.
"Robert McGeehan, The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and
European Defense After World War II (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p.
4.
12
Berlin should have indicated a need for greater conventional forces. In 1950,
U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles noted that "a defense on the Rhine
would mean the loss of Germany, while holding a line along the Elbe was
problematical due especially to a lack of troops."20 The West Germans could
fill this void in Central Europe. However, Germany in 1950 had barely begun
to recover from the devastation of Hitler's War.
The Allies had agreed to demilitarize the Third Reich and disband all
military formations, while sending to the dungeon leading officers guilty of
war crimes.21 The armament of the Federal Republic would be an
international political problem. However, only the occupying powers could
make this decision after an arduous process of debate. The Western allies
would have to overturn their policy of demilitarization as directed in the
Potsdam Agreement. To many Europeans in the 1950's, the rearmament of
Germany would send waves of fear shuddering throughout the continent. As
early as 1949, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer suggested rearming Germany to
gain immediate economic and political benefits.22 A balance had to be found
20
Ibid.
21Donald Abenheim, Reforging The Iron Cross (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1988), p. 39.
^Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "German-American Relations in the Postwar Decades," in
Frank Trommler and Joseph McVeigh, eds., America and the Germans: An
Assessment of a Three-Hundred-Year History, Volume II: The Relationship in the
Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), p. 94.
13
that would employ German strength for Western defense, while it integrated
the Federal Republic into a collective defense system.
Although the young Federal Republic was militarily helpless and open to
attack by the Soviet Army, it had valuable assets to draw from which the West
would use for a successful continental defense. German leaders, "conscious of
their strength despite the appearance of weakness, made a virtue out of
necessity."23 They successfully made demands upon the occupiers as the move
towards a German defense contribution accelerated.
Despite the pathetic weakness of the FRG at its birth, the geography of
the Cold War, the enduring strength of the German economy, and the elite
potential of the future German soldier strengthened the FRG in a direct way.
This development fostered the emergence of German figures who were
concerned with the defense of the FRG, especially in the wake of the Russian
attempt to cut off Berlin from the West.24
Konrad Adenauer sought the advice of former Wehrmacht officers who
had not disgraced themselves in the Third Reich. These officers analyzed what
they had done in the war and how they had succeeded and finally failed on the
battlefield.25 One outstanding officer who advised Adenauer on military and
security matters was General Hans Speidel, Erwin Rommel's Chief of Staff in






France. Speidel was a prominent general with extensive general staff
experience. He exerted an important and longstanding influence on Konrad
Adenauer and the emerging strategic ideas of the FRG government.26
General Speidel described West German security as the "concern of the
whole of Europe."27 He rejected ideas of an international guarantee of
neutrality for a demilitarized Germany. He was all too conscious of the threat
posed to central Europe by the massed power of the Soviet Army.
General Speidel was committed that the "strategic vacuum between the
Oder and the Rhine should be filled by the Western allies."28 As early as
1948, Speidel believed that Germany should turn to the United States, the only
country capable of fulfilling this demand.29
Konrad Adenauer based his demands on the Western Allies for security
largely on the military and strategic concepts of General Speidel. The Federal
Republic had to protect its citizens against attack through a policy of
deterrence. Adenauer's grand strategy was to be assured by an alliance with
the West. The threat of nuclear and conventional weapons in NATO would be











The Germans were willing to contribute conventional combat forces in the
shape of a German contingent in a mutual collective security system.31
Adenauer advanced his objective by placing the decision on the shoulders of
the Military Governors and the High Commissioners. Initially, Hans Speidel
gave little mention to the role of German forces in the defense of Central
Europe. However, in his strategical and operational ideas of the years 1950-
1954, Speidel added a role for German forces to the defense of Europe.32 He
signified that a German contribution of combat forces was to take place within
a collective European army. This action would muffle fears that German
soldiers would revive Prussian-German militarism.
Speidel also called for the complete political and military equality of
Germany and its eventual membership in NATO.33 Only through NATO
would the Federal Republic be able to fulfill the grand political demands
which Konrad Adenauer put forth. Adenauer embraced Speidel's strategy
wholeheartedly.34
The Korean War and the need to align firmly the FRG with the Western










Atlantic Alliance pressed the issue for a military contribution from the Federal
Republic of Germany.35
President Harry Truman examined NATO's early weakness and came to
the conclusion that "without Germany, the defense of Europe was a rearguard
action on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. With Germany, there could be a
defense in depth, powerful enough to offer effective resistance to aggression
from the East."36 If the Western allies were to take the risk of rearming the
Germans, they must accomplish two goals at once: "the new system of
European defense must simultaneously include the manpower and military
genius of the Federal Republic, while at the same time the new security system
must prevent the Germans from sowing the dragons teeth of an army of
aggression."37 American pragmatism and anticommunism led the U.S.
government to capitalize on German professional military expertise.
What first led to United States insistence on rearming West Germany was
troop strength within NATO.38 Other significant military-strategic factors
involving this decision were: the need to counter Soviet conventional force
superiority, counter the rearmament of the communist satellite states, deter an
35McGeehan, op. cit., p. 29.
36Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, Volume II (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1956), p. 253.
37Abenheim, manuscript, op. cit., p. 57.
^Hans Speier, German Rearmament and Atomic War: The Views of German
Military and Political Leaders (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1957), p. 8.
17
attack by the People's Police (KVP) of the GDR, employ German manpower
resources (considered impressive both as fighters and as experienced veterans
of Russian campaigns), and lastly to make up for any material deficiencies in
a time of crisis.39
Another strategic factor considered in the equation was Germany's
geographic position in Europe. Based on NATO strategy, the establishment of
a forward line of defense was crucial to prevent the Soviets from overrunning
the occupied areas in the event of an attack.40
The need to arm the Federal Republic now fully coincided with the
interests of the United States, Germany, and NATO. In May 1955, the Paris
Treaties granted the FRG sovereign status, membership in NATO, and
authorized it to raise a contingent force of 500,000 men.41 This diplomacy
stipulated a contribution by the Bundeswehr to western defense within the
framework of NATO and the WEU.
With the rearmament of Germany and a democratically instituted
government, the Cold War brought a distinct change between the Bundeswehr
and the Wehrmacht. The Bundeswehr is the first military force in Germany
that was created from an effective democracy. The FRG abandoned much of
39McGeehan, op. cit., p. 28.
4 White Paper 1985: The Situation and the Development of the Federal Armed
Forces, (Bonn: Federal Minister of Defense, June 1985), p. 27.
41Craig, op. cit., p. 242.
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the Prussian legacy and developed a very enlightened form of discipline and
leadership. This theory is based on the idea that a military force in a
democracy must treat people fairly.42
A significant number of citizens in the Federal Republic had enough of
war. They never again wanted to wear a uniform and bear arms. 43 This
public anxiety about the profile of a future war in Germany, helped to make
a reasoned discussion of operations and strategy in the 1950's and 1960's far
more problematic, than for example in the United States. The ethical, political,
and social constitution of the Bundeswehr during this period took up far
greater attention and energy than did questions of operations and strategy.
The political and economic rehabilitation of West Germany, and its
integration into a Western democracy, "was far more significant than the
eventual reappearance of German soldiers."44 The German's constructed a
highly successful economy in the post-war period. Throughout the Cold War,
one might perceive the attitude of Germans as: "The Bundesbank is more
important than the Bundeswehr."45
"Ibid., p. 244.
43Abenheim, op. cit., p. 153.
44McGeehan, op. cit., p. 13.
4SOpinion expressed by Professor Donald Abenheim, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA.
19
The Bundeswehr was created as a force within NATO and not as "an
instrument for independent military power projection on the part of the
FRG."46 The enduring fears of militarism in the Federal republic set very
strict political limits on what professional soldiers could do and say in the
FRG. In turn, these soldiers faced profound political and social obstacles to the
fulfillment of their mission.
The Germans have learned that a state cannot solve power problems with
armed forces solely. Militarism had been the worst evil of Prussian-German
history. Therefore, the combat units of the Bundeswehr, with the exception of
territorial units, would be placed under the operational control of NATO. 47
German soldiers faced a constant challenge of adapting to, and exerting
influence upon, NATO strategy. The evolution of strategic and operational
ides in the Bundeswehr, has reflected this ongoing struggle.48
During the Cold War, the Bundeswehr played a key role in NATO by
providing effective conventional forward defense in Europe. The FRG was the
only country in the North Atlantic Alliance to commit all its combat-ready
forces available for operations within the scope of NATO defense planning.49
The geographic location of West Germany along the border of the Warsaw Pact
46White Paper, op. cit., p. 72.
47
Ibid.
48Abenheim, manuscript, p. 1.
49White Paper, op. cit., p. 111.
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required significant conventional forces. The Bundeswehr provided the main
contribution of these forces at the border in Central Europe. 50 The main
mission of the Bundeswehr became over time to deter war rather than to fight
a war.
In comparison, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, the Bundeswehr
eclipsed the British and French armed forces. 51 The latter have nuclear
weapons, but the Germans have built an impressive and modern military in
Europe. It is the Germans and Americans who bore the primary burden of
Western defense within NATO during the Cold War. This shared German-
American leadership fostered the development of the Bundeswehr.
For thirty-five years the Bundeswehr was poised to resist Soviet military
aggression. Today it is obvious that in the near future there is little chance of
a coordinated military offensive against Germany by any military forces that
were part of the former Soviet Union. One can also presume that if such a
threat to German national security were to exist in the near future, there would
be sufficient warning time to enlarge and improve the Bundeswehr in order to
respond to that threat.
50
Ibid., p. 110.
"Abenheim, manuscript, op. cit., p. 60.
21
IV. SOURCES OF CHANGE
When the FRG and the GDR decided to unite in 1989-1990, they agreed
to abolish the NVA in favor of the Bundeswehr. Based on the Two-Plus-Four
Talks which concluded in Moscow on 12 September 1990, Article 3 of the
Treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany states: "The
Government of the FRG undertakes to reduce the personnel strength of the
armed forces of the united Germany to 370,000 (ground, air and naval forces)
within three to four years."52
Of significant note is the overall ceiling of 345,000 troops (ground and air)
accepted by Germany during the 1990 CFE Treaty. 53 Germany was the only
country with a politically binding commitment to the number of troops it could
have. The 1990 CFE Treaty limited five types of weapons but did not include
troop reductions. To the dismay of German leaders, this imposed an outlying
restriction on the newly sovereign nation. As a number of security experts
""Treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany," 12 September 1990,
Article 3, Section 2; Adam Daniel Rotfeld and Walther Stiitzle, eds., Germany and
Europe in Transition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 184.
"Catherine Guichard, Treaty On Conventional Armed Forces In Europe (CFE): A
Primer (Congressional Research Service, 5 July 1991), p. 6.
22
noted, it was evident that the Germans wanted a manpower cap for the other
nations in the CFE Treaty, just as they had in the Two-Plus-Four Treaty."54
In July 1992, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the former
Warsaw Pact countries, and most of the European countries in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) signed the "Concluding Act of the
Negotiation on Personnel Strength."55 Also known as "CFE 1A," this
agreement is the follow-up to the previous CFE negotiations. Unlike the limits
committed by Germany in the original CFE Treaty (weapons and personnel),
the ceilings established by CFE 1A were unilaterally declared by each state, not
subject to negotiation, and require no country to cut its forces. 56 Many of
these conditions were fully implemented by Germany within a year of
unification, an exceptional achievement. The most arduous and direct efforts
were those to close the NVA's facilities and to retire most of its personnel and
equipment.57
The NVA was established in 1956 and formed an integral part of the
Warsaw Pact. In peacetime, the NVA comprised of 170,000 troops from the
54This judgement is based on the author's interviews with specialists in European
security.
55Lee Feinstein, "25 Nations Sign CFE Follow-On," Arms Control Today,
July/August 1992, p. 29.
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army, air force, and navy. On 1 October 1990, the Warsaw Pact began to
vanish. The NVA command discharged all general and flag officers.
Furthermore, all professional soldiers over 55 years old were released.59 On
2 October 1990, the NVA ceased to exist.
On 3 October 1990, unification day, approximately 90,000 service personnel
and about 47,000 civilian employees joined the Bundeswehr on the basis of
special preliminary terms of service. The 6,000 remaining regular members of
the border troops and the civil defense organization of the GDR were taken
over by the Bundeswehr.60
To supervise the smooth transition after unification, the Federal Minister
of Defense Gerhard Stoltenberg established the Bundeswehr Eastern Command
and the Military Administrative District VII at the former NVA headquarters
in Strausberg near Berlin.61 This command, staffed with Bundeswehr officers
and civilian officials, worked with the remaining NVA staff. Nearly 2,000
servicemen and several hundred civilian officials from the Bundeswehr took
over commanding the newly established units and agencies.62
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Initially, Bundeswehr officers took over most command functions. Only
units of company size and half the battalions were headed by former NVA
officers. The first conscripts since 3 October 1990 from the former GDR
entered the Bundeswehr in January 1991."
On 1 July 1991, Bundeswehr Command East completed its formal
responsibilities and was replaced by Bundeswehr territorial commands in each
of the five new states. These districts consisted army, air force, and navy
command structures of the Bundeswehr structure for post-1994.64
Unfortunately, several factors associated with personnel will affect both
the quality and quantity of German forces. For example, the GDR's National
People's Army (NVA) was politically and militarily linked to the Warsaw
Treaty Organization (WTO). Their equipment structure and training were
largely patterned on the Soviet model.65
In view of Major Harald Renk, the first NVA officer to be commissioned
in the Bundeswehr, East German soldiers were told: "Our ties are all with the
Soviet Union and the armies of fraternal socialist states."66 The soldiers of the
NVA were consistently brain-washed with political jargon from the forces of
63
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communism within the WTO. "They were taught to feel implacable hatred of
the most aggressive forces of imperialism and their spearhead, the
Bundeswehr."67 Furthermore, political documentation recovered from the
NVA proves that the Bundeswehr was the main object of anti-NATO hate
training.68
After unification, the total strength of the combined East and West
German forces was approximately 590,000 troops, of which 90,000 had
previously belonged to the NVA.69 Not only did the German Armed Forces
have to be reduced, but the NVA had to be terminated and parts of it placed
in the Bundeswehr. By December 1994, the entire reorganization should be
completed in accordance with the internationally established parameters. Even
after the force reductions, the Bundeswehr will remain the largest military force
in Western and Central Europe.70
With the increase in Bundeswehr forces after unification, it became crucial
to the Western Allies to keep Germany in NATO. In July 1990, Chancellor
Helmut Kohl and President Mikhail Gorbachev of the former Soviet Union
67
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agreed that a united Germany could remain in NATO. 71 This step was a
significant achievement since the North Atlantic Alliance is the embodiment
of security in Germany, as well as Europe. Furthermore, with the vast change
in the operational and strategic environment since 1990, the Bundeswehr must
now structure their forces to fulfill the needs of NATO, the United Nations
(UN), and national defense.
Firmly aligned within NATO, Germany must ensure that the Bundeswehr
can provide effective forces both to manage crises and to counter an attack on
an ally or itself. As indicated in The Alliance's New Strategic Concept:
"Available forces will include, in a limited but militarily significant proportion,
ground, air and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to
a wide range of eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable. They will be
of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to deter a limited attack and, if
required, to defend the territory of the allies against attacks, particularly those
launched without long warning time."72 In light of NATO's new strategic
concept, Bundeswehr units for United Nation blue helmet missions, crisis
reaction, and humanitarian aid will be needed on short notice and equipped
differently. The demise of the Soviet Union has changed expectations about
the most probable military operations.
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Today, a major topic in the German Ministry of Defense and beyond is
the "out of area" issue. Many German politicians and military leaders
emphasize that Germany's credibility in NATO will be measured in terms of
its ability to provide military assistance to allies in a crisis. 73 On 2 October
1990, Chancellor Helmut Kohl in an address to South African president F.W.
De Klerk stated: "Now that German unity with complete sovereignty has been
achieved, the FRG is prepared to participate in UN measures aimed at
preserving and restoring peace through the deployment of its forces. We will
create the necessary internal conditions for this."74
Chancellor Kohl's belief is appropriate in light of the military solidarity
the FRG received from NATO allies during the past four decades.
Furthermore, there has been great controversy within the government
leadership over the future shape and size of the Bundeswehr. Defense
Minister Volker Riihe cited the goal of the Bundeswehr as "an army in the
alliance."75 With the responsibilities of a sovereign nation, comes the
necessity for Germans to participate in international affairs. Defense Minister
Riihe has also stressed the need for active participation in UN peacekeeping
73Christoph Bertram, "The Bundeswehr is still trying to find its real place in the
changed world," (Die Zeit, Hamburg, 4 September 1992), The German Tribune, 11
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operations. The record of German armed forces since 1945 suggests why this
goal has been so difficult.
29
V. POLITICS OF SECURITY
While Defense Minister Volker Rune argues for German forces to
participate in international crises, the out-of-area issue for the Bundeswehr has
brought forth great controversy amongst German parliamentarians. For
Germany, war has remained a relatively ineffective means to realize political
objectives. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the foundation of the
constitution (the Basic Law).
In May 1949, four years after the demise of the Third Reich, the Basic Law
was proclaimed by the Parliamentary Council. After twelve years of Hitler's
tyranny and four years of military occupation, the western part of Germany,
with the concurrence of the three occupying powers, adopted a liberal
democratic constitution which would guarantee a stable economic and political
future. 76 An important principle of the Basic Law is that the state owes its
existence to the will of the people, not vice versa as in National Socialist or
Communist systems.77
Second to the United States, the German Federal government has become
the most effective democratic institution in the free world. In May 1989,




celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the Basic Law, President Richard von
Weizsacker expressed: "The adoption of the Basic Law by the parliamentary
council opened the way for a German state, which is committed to democracy,
human rights and peace, and has earned the world's respect."78 The
fundamentally democratic concept of the Basic Law is expressed in an essential
phrase: "All power stems from the people."79
The Bundestag (German Parliament) is the popularly elected federal
legislature consisting of 662 members. The Bundestag seats only those parties
which receive five-percent of the popular vote. The five-percent clause is to
prevent an echo of the Weimar Era, when the National Socialists German
Workers Party rose to power. The electoral law guarantees political stability
while the election results reflect the political will of the people.80
The Bundesrat (Assembly of Constituent States), the second chamber,
represents the sixteen states of the FRG. It also shares in the legislative
process. Each state is allotted a number of voting seats depending upon the
size of its population. The Bundesrat's consent is required for constitutional
amendments and for federal legislation which directly affects the states
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affairs.81 In practice, because of its corrective function on behalf of the states,
the Bundesrat may be called the restraining branch of parliament. Problems
can arise for the Federal Government when the minority party in the Bundestag
has a majority in the Bundesrat.82
The Basic Law also addresses the significance of the political parties to the
political process. For the first time in German constitutional history, the parties
are essential instruments of the political will of the people. Candidates for
parliamentary election undergo a selection process within their parties before
qualifying for the ballot.83
As in any true democracy, it is the legislators which must determine how
to employ military forces. The key articles in the Basic Law that dominate the
controversy amongst German parliamentarians are Articles 24 and 87a of the
Basic Law. Article 24, Entry Into A Collective Security System, section (2) "For
the maintenance of peace, the Federation may enter a system of mutual
collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon its rights
of sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in









Article 87a, Build-up, Strength, Use, And Functions Of The Armed Forces,
was inserted by federal law of 19 March 1956, section (1) "The Federation shall
build-up armed forces for defense purposes. Their numerical strength and
general organizational structure shall be shown in the budget."85 Section (2)
of the same article reads: "Apart from defense, the armed forces may only be
used to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law."86 To prevent a
rehearsal of the past, Article 26 of the constitution explicitly bans the
preparation for wars of aggression.87
The issue of the role of the military is the source of considerable conflict
within the government and among the political parties. The discussion within
the parliament has been not so much on when and how the Bundeswehr
should be used for out-of-area missions, but whether such actions are allowed
by the Basic Law.
A recent example of this quagmire is the participation of German forces
in NATO AWACs surveillance flights over Bosnia. The patrols are staffed to







but also to direct fire, the nature of the reconnaissance mission changes to an
active military role.88
The nature of this mission, many in Germany believe, violates the
constitutional mandate that the German military may be used only for defense
purposes. Others in Germany argue that the deliberate vagueness of the
German constitution on the conditions under which military activity can occur,
are a reflection of the past and should be revised. Some interpret the
constitution to say that military actions under the aegis of the UN are
permitted, because they are not explicitly forbidden.89 This latter line of
thought supports German military activity under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.
The Free Democratic Party (FDP) forced the AWACs issue to the Federal
Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. The FDP wants to clarify the extent to
which the Bundeswehr may participate in UN missions that are out of the
NATO area.90 On 8 April 1993, the court approved German participation in
the AWACs mission but has not ruled on the issue of constitutionality.
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The AWACs issue is an example of how diverse the German politicians
interpret the Basic Law. The constitution directs but does not define the use
of the Bundeswehr. Germans are extremely conscientious of the constitution
and will fallback on the written law when a stipulation occurs as the out-of-
area question.
To interpret the Basic Law as it is written, does "a system of mutual
collective security" mean the UN, NATO, or WEU? In a historical context, one
would assume that Article 24 refers to NATO. This interpretation would not
allow German forces to deploy out-of-area as defined in NATO doctrine. What
exactly does the law mean by "defense purposes," as defined in Article 87a?
During the Cold War, the German parliament would have no problem defining
this. If the Soviets penetrated the Central European Front, the Bundeswehr
would have been used to protect the Fatherland along with the collective
defense of NATO.
Article 87a was created by the German parliament to prevent the
assignment of Bundeswehr troops outside of NATO territory.91 These legal
restrictions were written into the Basic Law in the 1950's. After the
Bundeswehr was created in 1955, it was decided amongst the FRG, United
91The Basic Law, op. cit., p. 54.
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States, United Kingdom, and France that Bundeswehr forces would only be
used for defending NATO territory.92
Prevailing interpretations of the Basic Law hold that the Bundeswehr may
be used only for defensive purposes within NATO. However, the German
Ministry of Defense has defined a mission of the Bundeswehr as to be
available for assignment in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter, after amendment of the Basic Law.93
All the political parties believe that the constitution should be less
ambiguous concerning the deployment of forces. Changes need to be made in
reference to the deployment of German forces to participate in UN military
action. These changes should be completed by 1994. This will be necessary
given the differences of opinion in the German parliament regarding the
interpretation of Articles 24 and 87a of the constitution.94
It is important to resolve these legal questions because the Germans must
endow the Bundeswehr to future European security and international crises.
The recent Bundestag vote to deploy troops to Somalia is a prime example. On
21 April 1993, the German parliament approved sending 1,600 soldiers to
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Somalia in June 1993.95 The Free Democrats, who had forced the AWACs
issue to the Karlsruhe court, accepted the view of Christian Democrats that
German soldiers would fulfill a purely humanitarian mission in Somalia.
There is general agreement in the Bundestag that a unified and sovereign
Germany must assume responsibility for international peace and international
law.96
What constitutional instruments are necessary to support a decision to use
force? The German government is currently debating possible changes to the
constitution. The debate focuses whether the Basic Law permits Bundeswehr
action in a global network. This measure would require a two-thirds majority
in both Houses of Parliament (Der Bundestag and Der Bundesrat) so that the
Bundeswehr can be deployed within the context of UN peacekeeping missions,
under a clean constitutional slate.97
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To understand the controversy within the German Parliament over
amending the constitution, it is crucial to discuss the divergent opinions of the
political parties. The German political party system is very similar to the pre-
1990 system in the FRG, with a few changes. After unification, 12 million
additional voters registered for the Bundestag election of 1990.98 Even with
the substantial increase in voters, the outcome did not fundamentally change
the balance of political forces within the parliament." Since the election of
Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1982, the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition has been the
driving force in the parliament.
A. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (CDUVCHRISTIAN SOCIAL
UNION (CSU)
The CDU was pioneered after the Second World War, partly as a successor
party to the old Catholic Center Party of the pre-1933 period. Under the
leadership of Konrad Adenauer in the post-war era, the CDU succeeded in
"bridging the gap that had traditionally separated Catholics and Protestants in
98lMichael Kreile, "The Political Economy of the New Germany," in Paul B. Stares,





German life.' The CDU has also provided a political haven for
conservatives, national constituents of the past, and for millions of refugees
who fled to the Federal Republic from the despotism of eastern Germany
during the Cold War.
It is the CDU where one can find the virtue of traditional German values.
Officially, the CDU adopts what one may call "Christian realism" along
conservative lines.101 Amongst members of the party, there is considerable
obsession with duty, honor, and country. German national rights and identity
are supreme principles amongst party members. Furthermore, the CDU is
absorbed in national security problems and despises Communism and
Socialism.102
The CDU and CSU alliance has not always been a congenial marriage.
The Christian Social Union of Bavaria is almost entirely Catholic, and tends to
be clearly more conservative and nationalistic than the CDU.103 Its anti-
communism is especially strong within the party membership. Furthermore,
a deep ideological gap separates the CSU from the Social Democratic Party.
Under the tenacious leadership of Franz-Josef Strauss, now deceased, the CSU








provided a significant contribution to the Federal Republics foreign policy
during the Cold War.104
The CDU is juxtaposed to the CSU in their ideological goals for the
German armed forces. They believe the Bundeswehr must take part in
collective security defense measures. Both parties foresee future international
crises where Germany must play a more expanded role. On 10 February 1993
at the Munich Security Policy Conference, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the CDU
stated: "Germany is a UN member. Those who claim the rights of a member
must also fulfill the duties. Anything else cannot be reconciled with Germany's
dignity."105
Since unification in 1990, the party of Chancellor Kohl and the CSU have
favored German participation in military missions outside the NATO area.
Until recently, their coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party, opposed any
military involvement in Bosnia without a change in the constitution.106 Prior
to the ruling by the Federal Court in Karlsruhe, the AWACs issue brought
momentous criticism between Defense Minister Volker Ruhe of the CDU and
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel of the FDP. After the court ruling, Kinkel and
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Riihe praised the decision to have aircrews remain in the AWACs. As
expressed by Kinkel; 'The FDP is now in agreement that the Germans continue
the mission."107
Using the AWACs controversy as one example, the CDU and CSU agree
that any reservations in the wording of the constitution need to be eliminated.
They want the Basic Law changed for political reasons. 108 The two parties
propose a change in Article 87a section (2): "German armed forces are only for
collective security systems and self-defense as the constitution explicitly
allows."109 This is contrary to the present interpretation for only defense
purposes.
The CDU/CSU also propose expanding Article 87a in order to deploy
armed forces concerning collective security systems: "The German government
is allowed, without approval from the Bundestag, to deploy forces in a
collective security system, as far as there are means, concerning humanitarian
aid, catastrophic help, or environmental protection. Deployment concerning UN
peacekeeping missions need a single majority vote in the Bundestag.
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Peacemaking operations need a majority vote in the Bundestag and
authorization by the Chancellor."110
This amendment would rectify any ambiguity in the constitution.
However, the CDU and CSU do not want their proposal before the floor of the
Bundestag prior to Summer break of 1993. Until then, they want the issue to
remain open for new compromising solutions. 111 This is a stall tactic similar
to a filibuster in the U.S. Congress. The two parties are pursuing this due to
fear of not achieving the two-thirds vote necessary to pass their amendment.
Since they have the majority of seats in the Bundestag, no other party will be
able to pass their proposal either. This will make it highly unlikely that any
change will be written into law until after the break.
The CDU and CSU also want to prevent the other parties from
writing any restrictions into the Basic Law on the deployment of forces.112
One can assume this action by party members so they can observe how the
peace process in the Balkans civil war is resolved. Therefore, the Kohl
government has not brought the issue of amending the constitution to the floor






B. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SPD)
The Social Democrats are Germany's oldest political party. They can look
back on a heroic record of resisting the Third Reich. Generationally, the SPD
is divided. The older members are reform oriented. Many of them are today's
SPD leaders who were socialized by the Third Reich, World War II, and
postwar reconstruction experiences. 113
On the other side is the younger and more critical generation. They have
been socialized in a postwar environment of economic abundance and the Cold
War.114 They are especially prominent in the left wing of the SPD. Some of
them left the party in the 1980's to join the ranks of the liberal minded Greens.
Former SPD Party Chairman Bjorn Engholm has been strongly in favor of
Bundeswehr participation in blue helmet operations. Unfortunately, Engholm
resigned from his post on 7 May 1993 due to an election scandal. He was
accused of committing perjury and laundering money. 115
The SPD is split over the out-of-area issue. The left wing of the SPD has
generated strong resistance to any expansion of the Bundeswehr's role. In May
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1991, the SPD declared its support for constitutional change to allow only UN
peacekeeping missions.116 This decision was possible only as a vote of
confidence in Engholm's leadership. Furthermore, the SPD "refused to sanction
German participation in combat missions under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter,
with or without operational control by the UN Military Staff Committee."117
The aim of the SPD's proposal is to place the deployment of blue helmets
under the UN, on a secure constitutional basis. They want to make this
possible by changing the Basic Law. They believe neither Article 24 or 87a of
the constitution, as it reads now, allows peacekeeping actions or formal blue
helmet operations that are based indeed under international law, as customary
right.118
Concerning a reform process of the UN, the Secretary General wants to
have contingent troops from as many countries as possible under UN
command. In this sense, the UN will ask Germany to participate and the SPD
would approve the necessary contracts and constitutional basis.
The SPD wants explicitly to state in the Basic Law what to do with blue
helmet operations, leaving no flexibility.119 The SPD wants everything








They want to think of every possibility that can take place. The problem is
they may sooner or later be faced with a situation where this is
contradictory.
The Social Democrats propose this change in Article 24: "The government
is only allowed to provide forces to the UN for peacekeeping operations
without combat tasks if the UN or other countries are asking for unarmed
members of German forces to fight against environmental dangers, provide
humanitarian aid, and to help when catastrophic events occur."120 Any other
use except as noted in their proposal would not be allowed.
Furthermore, they recommend "the government can provide forces if the
UN Secretary General is asking for them and if there is a solution by the UN
Security Council as well as the conflict involved countries agree. These forces
must be equipped with only light weapons and there has to be only enlisted
professionals who ask to be selected to go."121
The SPD also propose a change in Article 87a: "Only for defense of
country and for defense operations in reference to our mutual assistance pact,








This proposal is bound to bring future problems concerning German
security policy. The SPD is making it clear that their is no way for combat
operations of German armed forces under the UN. Last year, the Social
Democrats blasted Defense Minister Volker Riihe for ordering ships to the
Adriatic Sea. The German government, through its agreement in helping
NATO and WEU, sent ships for coastal surveillance monitoring the embargo
on Yugoslavia. The SPD opposition maintains that the Basic Law bans all
military actions except for self-defense.123
Prior to the AWACs ruling by the Federal Court, the SPD considered
filing another complaint about the deployment of forces as unconstitutional.
The SPD claims to support blue helmet peacekeeping operations, but it
demands that the Basic Law be changed.124 Recently, heavy resistance to the
Bundeswehr mission in Somalia has also been announced. The SPD questions
whether all these actions are consistent with the constitution.
There is recent evidence that the hard line against Bundeswehr combat
missions is breaking up. Foreign Policy spokesman Karsten Voigt and Security
Policy spokesman Walter Kolbow have advocated a clear change of course.
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Voigt said recently: "The SPD would not be able to govern unless it changed
its stand on the issue of Bundeswehr missions."125
C FREE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (FDP)
The Free Democratic Party has been represented in the Bundestag since
the founding of the Federal Republic. The party will play an essential role in
getting the Basic Law amended. The SPD/FDP coalition dissolved after the
nomination of Helmut Kohl for Chancellor in 1982. 126 Since then, the Free
Democrats have joined the bandwagon with the CDU and CSU to form a
coalition.
The FDP has expressed the need for political solutions and a broad
consensus on the out-of-area issue. The Free Democrats have stated: "It is
without dispute, that when an international crises occurs, in every case, all
diplomatical and political means must be exhausted, before deployment of
armed forces, which are a last resort."127
The Free Democrats support an amendment to allow German forces in any
action under the auspices of the UN.128 The FDP does not dispute that there
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is a peacekeeping and peacemaking function of German armed forces. The
point the FDP makes is that a unified Germany, on the basis of the UN Charter
and to the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), must
fulfill their international responsibilities.129 They see no reason to withdraw
from this responsibility. Referring to themselves as liberals, the Free
Democrats decided that "German forces in the future should be allowed to take
part when decisions of world security have to be supported with force."130
This position of the FDP could mean blue helmet operations as well as
last consequence combat operations for what the agreement of the members of
the Bundestag and majority deem necessary. The FDP has pointed out: "the
liberals are ready for changing the constitution."131 In this context, the
participation of German forces in UN missions can only be allowed after
changing the Basic Law.132
The FDP propose that the Bundeswehr can be deployed if there is
agreement from a majority in the Bundestag. Peacekeeping means decided by
the UN Security Council or in a sense of the UN Charter should be authorized
as far as Germany is a part of those.








Concerning peacemaking measures, Bundeswehr forces may be authorized
referring to Chapter VII and VIII of the UN Charter, and to a resolution by the
UN Security Council. Everything else pertaining to this measure should be laid
down in federal law. These proposals assume that deployment of forces in
commitment to ones allies is allowed referring to Article 24 and 87a of the
Basic Law.
The Free Democrats are encouraging the Social Democrats to come to this
solution.133 The FDP is ambitious to achieve a wide consensus on the out-of-
area issue. The Free Democrats have asked the Social Democrats to notice that
they also have a part in foreign policy, and would like them to agree with the
coalition on this issue.134 Furthermore, the FDP is optimistic, after the
constitution is amended, that a broad agreement will prevail to allow the
Bundeswehr to take part in international crises.
Based on a constitutional premise, the Free Democrats forced the AWACs
issue to the German Federal Court. On 31 March 1993, the UN Security
Council voted on military enforcement of the ban on flights over Bosnia. The
FDP was adamant that the German military role may be expanded only with
the explicit approval of the constitutional court. After the court ruled that






Minister Klaus Kinkel rallied the party around the courts decision. After a
joint press conference after the decision became known; "We have reached the
goal that we wanted to reach."135
The Free Democrats know that one cannot force such measures with a iron
fist. Someday when the Bundeswehr is deployed for an out-of-area crisis,
every German soldier will have rights under a clean constitutional basis,
support from the German people, and not just from some political parties.
Therefore, the FDP hopes for a change in the Basic Law shortly after Summer
break. They believe the SPD must respond to international responsibilities of
Germany and no longer disagree. Because the CDU and SPD are divided on
the issue, strong support by the smaller Free Democratic Party is crucial in the
decision.
D. GREEN PARTY/ALLIANCE 90
The western Green Party, which was founded in the FRG in the early
1980's, allied themselves with the civil rights group Alliance 90 of the former
GDR.136 There position with reference to the out-of-area issue reflects their
views on human rights and the protection of minorities.
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From a global point of view, the Greens want new thoughts on global
protection rather than the old categories of security policy. They stress human
rights and the protection of minorities cannot be rejected as interference in the
inner affairs of countries precipitates. In contrast, the German government is
supporting the classical instruments for civilization for international linkage
and is therefore mostly making policy of non-military conflict solution.137
The Greens assert that peacekeeping operations are the last level of
conflict resolution in which solutions of non-military have been overcome.
Peacekeeping operations are the end of conflict solving and are not the entry
into the escalation dynamic of military force. 138 The Greens insist that blue
helmets must have no escalation, only deescalation functions.
The Greens argue that peacekeeping operations by their nature belong to
Chapter VI of the UN Charter. There are no categories where customary rights
exist.139 However, UN blue helmet operations are a useful tool to secure a
resolution. As a consequence, the Greens demand the following: "The
Bundestag may authorize the deployment of German forces to take part in
peacekeeping operations. The government should use all state and non-state,
non-military, non-violent means of conflict resolution. German forces are
deployed only for the UN as an international collective security system, not






under NATO or WEU command. Reform of the UN Charter is necessary. The
aim is to eliminate the status of permanent members of the UN Security
Council and sacrifice the veto each country has. Deployment of forces are only
for peacekeeping operations referencing Chapter VI of the UN Charter. A
maximum number of 2,000 soldiers are allowed to join such forces from
Germany. The Bundeswehr must further reduce and restructure their forces,
a structure which has the aim of never being able to start a war itself."140
The last line of this proposal is already written in Article 26 of the Basic
Law. The Greens want armed forces which are unable to take the first step.
Making the armed forces unable to attack makes them ineffective. The Greens
might as well say they want no forces. They do want a civil security system,
without the military or police.141 The Greens are advertising environmental
topics, they are out of sync with reality. Bottomline, the Greens have a real
problem with authority.
Referring to Article 24, the Greens believe "the government can leave
sovereign rights to international organizations as long as the rights of states are
considered."142 Furthermore, they want a two-thirds majority vote in the










The Greens propose the following to Article 87a: "The government can
commission forces for defense, but their growth and organization depends on
the budget. The government is allowed to give other organizations the right to
commission forces which will serve in a system of collective security for
keeping peace in the world."144 This is a very general statement by the
Greens. There is nothing concrete in the Greens logic for changing the Basic
Law and deployment of forces.
The Greens want to reduce the power in the government from the top,
down to the state level. This sounds like placing the region into vestiges as it
was prior to German unification in the 1870's. The Greens constantly want to
reduce the defense budget. They give ideas but lack real concrete solutions.
The Greens have unrealistic ideas on German security policy and how the
country should enter the 21st century. They should focus their ideas on how
the emissions from a Mercedes Benz effects the pine trees in the Black Forest.
The Greens have further defined the mission of the Bundeswehr for
peacekeeping operations. "Members of the armed forces are allowed to defend
the FRG and to be involved in defense operations concerning commitments to
ones allies. Only in the case that attack is through no fault of the FRG, may
forces deploy out-of-area for peacekeeping means. For those measures, the




General is asking for them and the UN Security Council has decided in this
sense. Those forces will only be equipped with light weapons for self-defense
and must consist of active professionals and enlisted who volunteer for such
missions. Every operation in this sense needs two-thirds majority of all
members of the Bundestag. Germany is not to be involved in peacekeeping
concerning neighboring countries."145 Do statements like this need to be
made in a sovereign nation's constitution? This proposal is illogical.
The state law can allow the forces in the case of actual defense or
crisis in accordance to police rights, protect civil objects, and assume tasks
concerning direction of traffic, as far as this is necessary to the task of
defense.146 This assumes that your military will be used for directing traffic.
The Greens want to make this a topic in the Basic Law. The forces have in
every situation to pay attention to current police rights and work together with
the responsible authorities.
The Greens are just criticizing and do not know how their ideas effect the
wealth of the people and the German nation. Other parties at least have an
idea on what the future of Germany and the Bundeswehr should look like.
The Greens/Alliance 90 intend to make application in reference to the





organization with the agreement of having German blue helmets for UN
operations. They demand UN reform.
Based on this analysis, the Greens no longer subscribe to practices that are
sync with German society. Due to a constitutional court ruling following the
1990 elections, the Greens were spared from the five percent threshold
requirement to win seats in the Bundestag.147 This was a one-time exception
for the Greens and does not guarantee that they will survive the 1994 federal
election. Younger Germans are turning more conservative. If the Greens
cannot "rejuvenate themselves with good issues and new voters, the Greens
will become a minor party of aging hippies."148
E. PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM (PDS)
The PDS is the offspring of the defunct Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the
former GDR. The PDS are former communists, who claim to be socialists.
They, like the Greens, are too small to enjoy all the rights accorded to other
parties. The PDS also was allowed to be represented in the Bundestag, only
because of the special arrangement made following the 1990 federal election.
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The PDS postulate that the international situation allows a new foreign
policy approach which is oriented on peace policy criteria. "Forces as a means
of politics were unuseful and were not serving the interests of humans.
Therefore, especially today, forces are unnecessary. But nevertheless, power
politics and interest oriented practices are influencing how other countries act.
This is clearly evident in the behavior of the wealthy countries in the
West."149
The PDS has a hypothesis to change the behavior of political policy.
'This can happen on different levels, first a country can explicitly refuse to use
military means to force own interests. It can show this practically through
refusing extra territorial use of the military. A country can in advance say they
can never have forces outside their own limits."150
Similarly, the PDS believe that cooperative policy can be demonstrated
through installment and help of civil organizations. "A new friendly
international system can be achieved through cooperation. Cooperation also
means to refer exploitation of the periphery and of the resources for short term
profit interests."151 This theory sounds like an idea along the lines of Marx,
Lenin, and Engels.






Excluding military intervention, the PDS believe "conflict reducing
support measures have to be made possible and non-intervention regimes have
to be developed."152 They maintain that wealthy capitalistic countries must
refer to military intervention because they sell their weapons to the Third
World. Furthermore, there foundation is due to greed by the capitalists.
The PDS is assigning guilt to the West. Since the West sells weapons to
a country for profit, they believe the West cannot enforce their policies and
destroy the country they sold them to. This logic would clearly blame the arms
sales to Iraq on U.S. and German businessmen. Another analogy of a party
that grew-up in a communist society.
In light of this discussion, the PDS demand from the government: "to
agree to conflict prevention and conflict ending competence of the CSCE, only
if there are no military components."153 The PDS does not want to have
changes in the CSCE which gives them more authority, unless CSCE agrees to
have no military components. The PDS refuse to have a commission of CSCE
blue helmet troops and ensure that CSCE cannot take, or have, the means to
assign other troops for blue helmet operations. Green helmet troops of CSCE
should have only non-military character, and should only consist of members








The PDS wants the Bundestag to make sure that neither now or in the
future, German soldiers will be employed alone outside the limits of Germany
for military or civil operations, or together with other countries, or in the frame
of international institutions. They demand from the government that all prior
agreements given to other countries about Germans in blue helmet operations
under UN, NATO, or WEU, be eliminated. The PDS accuse the German
government about misinformation on UN operations such as Cambodia, and
accuse them of hiding information from the people. 155
These accusations are not true. Their are many channels that the German
government can deliver information, including the media, to inform the public
on these operations. You can't demand to be informed every place, all the time.
For example, George Bush could not tell the American public when he was
going to strike Iraq. In fact, this is why the FRG wants to keep conscription
service. The draft will keep the military closely aligned with the people.
It is highly unlikely the PDS will be involved in the future on major
issues within the German government. They, as the Greens, have no skill at
mediating between imagination and reality.
F. REPUBLIKANER
As an expression of voter frustration, the right-wing Republican Party




German election held this year, the Social Democrats suffered extreme losses.
Chairman Engholm described the losses for his party as a "considerable
reverse."
156 Both his party and the CDU are casualties of a deep frustration
on the part of the voters toward all those who govern in Hessen and Bonn.
Chancellor Kohl saw the scanty results for his party as "an expression of the
poor public image of the CDU."157
This victory for the right-wing is not to be construed as a rise in German
nationalism and the birth of the Fourth Reich. German citizens are
disillusioned by the asylum problem, record postwar unemployment, and the
problems of unification which have stymied the CDU/CSU/FDP governing
coalition's ability to lead.
G. FURTHER ANALYSIS
Besides the conception of legality which interprets the Basic Law as
allowing combat operations in reference to the NATO contract, but not
operations under UN, today there are more and more politicians and legal
authorities having another point of view. There is a far reaching consensus
that a sovereign Germany, as a member of international security organizations,
must take responsibility as a member to secure and restore peace in the world.
15
*'Engholm: Local Elections in Hessen a 'Warning Signal' for CDU and SPD," The




On 13 January 1993, the governing coalition indicated it would seek a
change in the Basic Law to explicitly allow Bundeswehr participation in UN
operations.158 The agreement provides for German participation in
peacekeeping and peace-restoring operations. Furthermore, the agreement
would provide for combat operations under the auspices of NATO, CSCE, or
WEU even without a decision by the UN Security Council.159 UN Secretary
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has called for a "comprehensive participation"
by Germany in all UN missions.160 The SPD thus far have only agreed to
strictly peacekeeping operations.
The governing coalition do not want the out-of-area issue so defined that
it cannot fit in the Basic Law for future problems or crises. The SPD even
wants the use of forces for humanitarian aid written into the constitution. 161
Only the UN should have the monopoly to force someone to deploy troops,
even though most of the countries in the UN have dictatorial governments vice
democracies.
The Ministry of Defense has indicated that troops serving outside of
NATO jurisdiction would only consist of three to four battalions trained for
158
"Governing Coalition Seeks German Involvement In UN Blue Helmet
Operations," The Week In Germany (New York: German Information Center, 15
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blue helmet operations. This requirement would affect only a small part
of the Bundeswehr's personnel and material.163 As noted by German Foreign
Minister Klaus Kinkel: "Within the framework of her constitution, Germany
has already assisted with UN operations in Angola, Cambodia, Central
America, and Namibia."164
The CDU/CSU/FDP coalition should force the issue and get an
amendment to the Basic Law. An amendment to the constitution to deploy
forces will be difficult to pass in the parliament. This is why the two parties
want to wait until after Summer break. They are afraid of responding too
quickly. Unfortunately, this is appeasement at its best. What good is a
democracy if there is no solution? The Western allies need to know they can
confide in the Germans in a time of crises. As recently expressed by Defense
Minister Riihe: "The nature of Germany's sovereignty requires a military force
that can be used flexibly. If it is neglected, our foreign policy also threatens to
lose credibility."165
162Bertram, op. cit., p. 5.
163
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Several crises in the last three years have pressed the issue for German
military forces to participate in regional conflicts. One example would be the
Gulf War analogy. The unification of Germany coincided with the Iraqi crisis.
After Saddam's forces invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, German politicians
were hesitant to become involved in the Gulf crisis since it might interfere
with unification.166 As discussed by Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher: "Even
after unity and sovereignty were gained, Germany's reaction to the Gulf
conflict continued to be profoundly shaped by the legacies of the post-war
period."167 The FRG's slow reaction to requests from the United States for
financial assistance for the Gulf War helped to stimulate the unfavorable press
coverage Germany received on the issue.
The media only exacerbated the poor public image Germany received
concerning its military assistance and public abstinence in the Gulf crises.
However, politicians argued that the German Basic Law prevented combat
166Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher, "Germany in the Iraq Conflict," in Nicole
Gnesotto and John Roper, eds., Western Europe and the Gulf (Paris: The Institute for




troops from being deployed to the Gulf conflict. 168 Much of the bad press
and accusations were due to the export of dual-use items to Iraq. It is
imperative to understand that Germany played a vital role in assisting the
allied coalition in the conflict. The truth of the matter can be confirmed by
Christoph Bertram: "Had it not been for air bases located in Germany, from
which U.S. troops were flown to the Gulf, and for the availability of massive
German ammunition supplies, Operation Desert Storm would scarcely have
succeeded."169 Overall, Germany provided $11.4 billion to the allied coalition
in the form of military hardware, services, and cash payments.170
The Gulf War was a prime case to scrutinize the Basic Law. In reference
to Article 24 and 87a, Germany supported a NATO partner even when it did
not entail the defense of German territory. The Bundeswehr was deployed to
Turkey as part of NATO's effort to deter Saddam.
The crisis in Yugoslavia is mounting with unforeseen consequences.
Germany has pledged DM114.7 million in direct aid to the region, compared
to Italy's DM86.4 million and the United States DM82 million.171 Germany
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is also conducting a naval role in the Adriatic Sea in support of UN sanctions
against Serbia and Montenegro. However, the German vessels have a limited
role there. They cannot enforce sanctions, but merely report ships suspected
of breaking the UN embargo.172 Once again, the Germans open themselves
up to being accused of half-hearted gestures.
At present, the Ministry of Defense plans to "maintain compulsory
military service" along with preparing the Bundeswehr for "blue helmet"
operations outside the NATO area.173 Last year, these plans did not meet
popular approval in Germany. According to a study conducted by the
Academy for Information and Communication which the Bundeswehr runs,
two-thirds of all Germans advocate a volunteer army.174 A clear majority
reject German soldiers participating in UN missions similar to the Gulf War.
Furthermore, there was only broad support for the Bundeswehr to participate
in UN peacekeeping "blue helmet" operations.175
In spite of public opinion, it is unlikely that Germany will go to a
volunteer force. First, Germany has one of the lowest birth rates in the world.
The Bundeswehr will face declining numbers in the draft-age groups in the
172
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nineties. The Bundeswehr will therefore have to extend the term of basic
military service or take other measures to maintain personnel strength at
370,000 after 1995.176 Second, a volunteer force is extremely expensive.
Germans don't like running budget deficits. According to the Ifo Institute for
Economic Research, Germany's national debt will rise by seventy percent to
DM2 trillion ($1.2 trillion) by December 1995.177 Third, conscription service
has worked very efficiently during the last four decades in the FRG.178
As for public opinion on UN missions, it seems unlikely that a united
Germany will retain a "status quo" approach on its international duties. In the
late 1980's, the Allensbach Institute, conducted a survey in the FRG on the out-
of-area issue. They found a relative majority of West Germans were against
any participation by the Bundeswehr in UN missions.179 The prevailing
opinion then was that Germany's past weighed more than international
obligations.180 It precluded any participation of German forces.
176White Paper, op. cit, p. 112.
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Today, only a minority makes reference to Germany's past in this respect.
Only 31 percent of those surveyed in western Germany are against the
participation of German forces.181 Of significance, 54 percent regard it
beyond comprehension that a country as important as Germany should shirk
its international responsibility.182
In the new federal states, public opinion is different. Those who support
German participation in UN combat missions balance out those who oppose
the role. After four decades of a military driven society, the impetus has died
in the minds of east Germans. They are more aware of the threat of combat
forces, rather than heir peacemaking function.183
The governing coalition in the German Parliament must increase public
sentiment on the need to participate in combat operations. In a May 1991
nationwide poll conducted, Germans favored the continued leadership of the
Christian Democratic Union (CDUVChristian Social Union (CSUVFree
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Unfortunately, the future of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition and the
leadership of the CDU is uncertain. The internal problems with the economy,
"the Skinheads," and the foreign asylum issue may cause trouble for the
Christian Democrats in the 1994 election. According to a poll taken by the
Emnid Opinion Research Institute, if Bundestag elections were held on 9
November 1992, the SPD would receive 38 percent of the vote and the
CDU/CSU a close 37 percent of the vote.185
The Social Democratic Party (SPD) has put up the most resistance to
changing the constitution and the deployment of Bundeswehr forces in an out-
of-area crisis. The SPD is the major factor in the equation. They are the
largest opposition party, holding approximately thirty-six percent of the seats
in the Bundestag. A two-thirds majority in the Bundestag is only possible with
their support.
The government achieved the support of the SPD for corpsmen in
Cambodia, and the airlift of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo, Bosnia-
Herzegovinia.186 These measures by the Germans have been strongly
supported at home and abroad.187 However, the inability of all the political
parties to agree on the legality of troop deployments under the auspices of the
185
"Opinion Poll Shows SPD Leading CDU/CSU," Hamburg, Welt Am Sonntag(08
November 1992), FBIS-WEU-92-220(13 November 1992):12
186
"Riihe: FRG UN Missions Lack Necessary Basis," Mainz ZDF Television




UN has created strong opposition to the Bundeswehr engaging in military
operations outside of the homeland. One thing is clear for the overwhelming
majority, that participation in UN combat missions should only involve
professional soldiers and volunteers.188
Chancellor Kohl explained in August 1990 that "there cannot be a division
of labor where Germany stands aside making money while the rest of the
world does the dirty work."189 As ambitious as some may be to see the
Germans play a role in blue helmet operations, the Bundeswehr is not yet a
fully capable force for dealing with international crises. 190 According to Hans
Ruhle, chief of planning under Manfred Woerner in the Defense Ministry
(Woerner has since risen to the post of NATO Secretary General), the
Bundeswehr is "conditionally combat ready."191 Ruhle's statement is based
on facts: "There is currently not a single formation of battalion size on up that
would be available as a self-contained unit for operational employment. There
are no formations manned exclusively by fully trained soldiers in the
Bundeswehr."192 This may come as a shock to most of the international
188
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community, especially when one considers the military potential of the
Germans.
Added to this problem is the Bundeswehr's equipment. At best, German
soldiers are outfitted to meet the requirements of operational employment in
NATO's jurisdiction, but not out of area.193 At present, a change in
equipment to the degree necessary would cost more money than the taxpayer
is willing to pay. 194 Unification will limit financial resources for many years.
Political interests will continue to be focused on domestic concerns as is the
case in the United States.
How do the Bundeswehr soldiers view their new operational role in the
international spectrum? When will the troops involved be confident about the
operational principles of a rapid-reaction force and peacekeeping operations?
How do the soldiers feel about being subjected to substantially greater danger
than standing guard duty near the Fulda Gap? All these questions are
important to the average German soldier.
Today, the Bundeswehr is not the most esteemed institution in the
heartland of Germany. 195 Many soldiers do not believe they are being used
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service and on the size of the Bundeswehr has a direct effect on the soldiers
esprit de corps. 196 A large organization like the Bundeswehr, which is
primarily made up of people, is especially in need of high morale, integrity,
and security. There is no better feeling in the world than waking up in the
morning and looking forward to going to work. A person must enjoy what he
is doing and be proud of what he is doing. An effective military establishment
needs personnel with high self-esteem.
The Bundeswehr must have a common vision and high expectations. Poor
morale in the forces may ultimately block the operational capability of the
Bundeswehr. As a result, this will directly affect the acceptance of the
Bundeswehr in German society.197 It will take leadership from the German
Parliament, not just the Chancellor and the Defense Minister, to give the
Bundeswehr the label as an "elite force" in which they desperately deserve.
One can be certain there are units with good superiors who keep morale
high amongst their troops. However, the overall picture looks bleak as did the
morale in U.S. forces during the 1970's. As Defense Minister Ruhe cited on 12
July 1992: "The soldiers need good equipment, they need social security, and
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assurances will support for UN "blue helmet" operations be there if body bags
start coming home to Germany. The Bundeswehr needs support from the
government and the people.
From this lesson on cohesion in the military, the Germans can learn from
one of their own. Clausewitz "made the psychology of the soldier, his
commander, and the society they served an essential part of the theory of
war."
199
There needs to be effective leadership from the German government. The
Chancellor and Defense Minister can raise the issue all they want, but it will
take a strong coalition in the German Parliament to make the Bundeswehr an
elite fighting force available for duty under the auspices of the United Nations.
Whatever may happen to the Bundeswehr, reflection on its mission and its
military structure is something that should be done in the German
Parliament.200 Clausewitz wrote: "The political purpose for which war is
fought should determine the means that are employed and the kind and degree
of effort required. The political purpose should also determine the military
objective."201 On the contrary, what Clausewitz failed to ingrain in the
199Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
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Germans was an overall grand strategy. You cannot expect to win two world
wars by uniting the industrial powers of the world against you.
Germany has the capability to strengthen the United Nations as an
international organization. Even though Germany is a non-nuclear member,
the economic, military, an political influence the country possesses should
grant it a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
With limited financial resources due to unification, the Bundeswehr will
not receive the priority it deserves in the German government. The 1993
Defense Budget at DM50.8 billion is the second highest individual budget in
the German Federal Budget.202 Unfortunately, the defense budget has
dropped by DM1.31 billion in 1993.203 In light of the scarce resources, how
will the Ministry of Defense finance its new force structure? In this situation,
the programming and budgeting of the Bundeswehr will follow three steps:
reduce operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, prioritize all procurement
projects, and intensify international cooperation.204
202,,Draft Budget Cuts Defense Spending," Berlin DDPU8 August 1992), FBIS-WEU-
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Can the Germans continue to satisfy their international obligations
through "checkbook diplomacy" in the future? After amending their
constitution, the Germans should assume all the rights and responsibilities of
a member of the UN. A united and sovereign Germany must fulfill all the
duties for preserving world peace outlined in the UN Charter. During his
recent visit to Bonn, the UN Secretary General indicated: "We need the FRG's
complete participation in peacekeeping, peace-creating, and peacemaking
measures."
205 The current UN operation in Somalia will remind German
politicians, once again, of the need to fulfill their international duties.
Two years have gone by since Chancellor Kohl's speech on 2 October 1990
to South African President De Klerk. Today, there is little popular support in
Germany for UN blue helmet operations, nor are there financial resources
within a decreasing defense budget. But who can say that popular support is
always right? After all, 90% of the people in the 1935 Saarland plebiscite voted
to join the Third Reich.206
20SBoutros-Ghali paraphrased by Kohl in "Kohl Addresses Munich Security Policy
Conference," op. cit., p. 5.
206Jackson J. Spielvogel, Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History, (Prentice Hall,
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German politicians are not accepting their country's military
responsibilities fast enough to satisfy Germany's foreign critics. We are living
with a new generation of Germans who are dedicated to the principles of
democracy. Since 1949, the German democratic experience has been highly
successful. Experts in international security agree that Germany's leaders must
cast off the burden of the past and start acting like the leaders of a sovereign
nation.
There are difficult issues of culture and history. The dilemma for German
politicians is that, if they try to preach a return to traditional virtues, they run
the risk of sounding like Nazis.207 The new generation of Germans has much
to be proud of. They wish to have nothing to do with the negative elements
of the nation's past. Although he was never a Nazi, Franz Josef Strauss, former
Prime Minister of Bavaria and CSU member, used to tell Germans that they
should not be ashamed of their past.208 The carnage of World War II was not
entirely Germany's fault. Pride in Germany is nonetheless growing slowly.
Many Germans see unification as an opportunity to reestablish national
dignity. If the Germans want to be respected as full participants in the
international community, they will have to learn to accept the military
responsibilities that entails. This will be the key to Germany's future position
207David Marsh, The Germans: The Pivotal Nation, (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1989), p. 33.
208Roskin, op. cit., p. 183.
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in international politics. From an old Chinese proverb: "We do not inherit the
land from our ancestors, we borrow it from our children."
Today, Germany is facing extraordinary issues of sovereignty. The
Germans are not adjusting easily to these changes. The international
community should recognize that the reconstruction of Germany will take
longer than was originally predicted. Germany is still the single most
important ally of the United States in Europe with reference to its conventional
combat power, its economic strength, and its political influence. The
Bundeswehr faces a head-on challenge with the political and social crisis in
Germany at the moment. The Germans are acutely aware from their past of
how political turmoil can result from serious economic and social crisis.
However, with all the burdens of unification, the Bundeswehr can be lauded




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 052 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey CA 93943-5002
3. N51, The Pentagon, Room 4E572 1
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350
4. N31, The Pentagon, Room 4E572
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350
5. Director, Naval Intelligence (N2)
The Pentagon, Room 5C600
Washington, D.C. 20350
6. N-511, The Pentagon, Room 4D563
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350
7. CAPT E.A. Smith, Jr, USN





8. European Division/NATO Policy Branch
J-5 PNT Room 20965
Joint Staff
Washington, D.C. 20301
9. Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau
Chairman, National Security Affairs (NS/Bn)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943








12. LCDR Eric H. Brandenburg
Naval Construction Battalion Center
Security Detachment, Building 117
5200 CBC 2nd Street
Gulfport, MS 39501-5001
77



3U0I.E? KNeK LIBRARY
fljVAL POSTGRAPUATE SCHOOL
ftC^TEREY CA &»43-5101

